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WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS: REAGAN, BUSH AND NUCLEAR WAR. By Robert
Scheer. Random House, New York, 1982. Pp. 279.
Reviewed by Eugene W. Hickok, Jr.*
Alexander Hamilton is credited with saying, almost two hundred
years ago, that the touchstone of a prudent foreign policy for the
United States is to prepare for war and proceed to negotiate. Today,
however, the world is a far more threatening place. The rivalries that
exist today between the East and the West are the product of a clash
of interests and ideologies. More importantly, international negotia-
tions, in this age of nuclear weapons, no longer are based upon a sys-
tem of trust among professional diplomats, but are founded upon the
harsh realization that it is not only naive to trust one's adversary, it is
dangerous. As Sir Harold Nicolson pointed out long ago, we are actors
in an international arena in which "the old currency has been with-
drawn from circulation, we are dealing with new coinage."'
This fundamental transformation in the character and conduct of
international relations among major powers-from diplomacy based
upon trust to negotiation under the assumption of mistrust-poses
particularly vexing problems for liberal regimes such as the United
States. In this country, citizens are expected to take an interest in for-
eign affairs and to have an opinion on national defense. The complex-
ity of defense policy, however, has rendered it difficult to provide them
with information on which to base their judgment. We live in an age in
which national defense is reduced to a bewildering alphabet soup of
acronyms that stand for everything from military hardware (ICBM,
MX, BI) to strategic options (MAD, SALT I, SALT II, START). Most
citizens do not understand the nuances of American foreign policy.
They want only to feel safe and secure, and prefer to put the idea of a
nuclear holocaust out of their minds. They desire a strong national de-
fense, but feel that they lack an adequate understanding of the politi-
cal and strategic thinking that goes into defense policy.
The nuclear freeze movement indicates, however, that people here
and elsewhere have come to recognize that a great deal is at stake
when the defense budget is passed or when a new nuclear arms negoti-
ator is appointed. The increased popular interest in achieving mean-
ingful and responsible arms control represents a growing fear among
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individuals that things have gotten out of hand and that the world is
truly on the brink of Armageddon. Popular sentiment regarding the
threat of nuclear war, however, is not necessarily informed sentiment.
After all, nuclear war is not the issue. Nobody wants nuclear war. The
issue is how to prevent such a war from occurring. In the absence of a
truly well-informed public, popular sentiment can be of only modest
help when addressing this issue. Robert Scheer, the author of With
Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, no doubt recognizes
this fact. The tone of the book suggests that he is on an urgent mission
to inform the people of the threat to world peace that, he maintains, is
being created by the current Administration's attitude toward nuclear
war and promoted by the men who have been appointed by President
Reagan to negotiate arms control. Scheer' a journalist with the Los An-
geles Times, has written an interesting and quite thought-provoking
book, but not a very good book. In his attempt to make the issues more
easily understandable, he has yielded to simplicity. In his attempt to
inform the reader of the character of the men who are responsible for
formulating our nation's defense policies, he dwells upon personalities
and anecdotes far more than actions and circumstances.
Three factors must be considered when analyzing the formulation
and merits of defense policy: facts, the perception of facts and the
character of the men and women who must make decisions based upon
those facts and perceptions. The threat of nuclear war has not altered
these considerations; it only has raised the stakes and thereby has
made decision-making tougher. The facts regarding the strength of the
superpowers are harder to uncover and are more difficult to interpret
than they were before the nuclear age. Mr. Scheer dismisses too casu-
ally the arguments surrounding this nation's window of vulnerability
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. What is troublesome, as Scheer points out,
is the surprising lack of consensus on this issue. His reaction is to ar-
gue that a real threat to national security does not, therefore, exist.
This assertion is simplistic at best. Although it may never be possible
to deliver complete and accurate information regarding Soviet military
strength, it is possible, and imperative, that more complete informa-
tion be obtained before a defense proposal is implemented. Consensus
may evade us regarding the facts surrounding the debate, but common
sense should not.
The perception of Soviet strength matters a great deal, because
facts are difficult to provide and because the real military strength of
both superpowers is constantly changing as new, more effective weap-
ons and technologies are developed. Perceptions of Soviet strength are
colored, sometimes to a great extent, as much by the way one views
Soviet society and what it stands for as by whatever information can
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be gathered through United States intelligence. The views of the So-
viet Union that are held by Ronald Reagan and George Bush obviously
bother the author. Scheer is concerned when candidate Reagan con-
fides in him that "we have a different regard for human life than those
[Soviet] monsters do."'2 He reacts with incredulity when Reagan asks
him to consider why the United States has not developed the means to
stop incoming missiles.8 As for George Bush, the author seems far more
disturbed by the Vice President's personality and appearance than by
his statements. In a particularly distasteful paragraph, Scheer finds it
important to point out that Mr. Bush is "one of those well-turned-out
Yale men of a bygone era who seem to thrive on subtle distinctions of
class and status."'4 Such statements weaken Scheer's argument by
bringing his professionalism into question and helping to demonstrate
that the author is more interested in convincing the reader than in
informing him.
At the heart of Scheer's book is his argument that the current Ad-
ministration embraces the attitude that nuclear war is merely another
form of conventional war. The "hawks" and "neo-hawks" in the Rea-
gan administration are unreconstructed cold warriors who reject any
notion of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union and who "believe
in the possibilities of fighting and winning a protracted nuclear war. '
Scheer finds that the United States has moved from a foreign policy
aimed at the avoidance of nuclear war to a policy of "preparation for
its possible outbreak."6 He argues that such a policy precludes the pos-
sibility of meaningful arms control negotiations, will lead almost inevi-
tably to further escalations in the arms race and may lead to nuclear
war itself. According to the author, if Reagan is playing chicken with
the Soviet Union, he is playing a very dangerous game, and if he be-
lieves his own statements, then he is dangerous.
The threat Scheer perceives is posed by men the President has
appointed to act as arms negotiators. Members of the "Cold War ca-
bal" include Eugene Rostow-who according to Scheer, looks wistfully
back upon the Cuban missile crisis as the good old days-and a curious
man named T.K. Jones, a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. Jones
not only argues that nuclear war is winnable, but also argues that most
Americans can survive if there is a good civil defense plan and enough
2. R. SCHEER, WITH ENOUGH SHOVELS: REAGAN, BUSH AND NUCLEAR WAR 31 (1982).
3. Id. at 104. In an interesting passage foreshadowing the "Star Wars" speech of
March 1983, Reagan remarks that he is struck by the irony that "with the great technol-
ogy of ours, . . . we cannot stop any of the weapons that are coming at us." Id.
4. Id. at 30.
5. Id. at 8.
6. Id. at 5.
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shovels with which to dig enough fallout shelters (hence the title of the
book).
The author's main point is that these men, along with the Presi-
dent, are entering the process of arms control under the assumption
that nuclear war is winnable. Scheer disagrees that this policy is viable
and offers the opinions of several eminent individuals who support his
argument. But his argument is flawed by his simplistic notion of the
arms control process. For Scheer, arms control means limiting and
eventually reducing arms. Realistic arms control policy, however, may
not lead to either of these outcomes. In a world of incomplete informa-
tion regarding the relative strengths of nations and the intent of na-
tional actors, the goal of arms control is to ensure that sound judgment
governs defense policy. Mr. Scheer obviously questions the judgment of
the President and his appointees. His criticism springs from his oppo-
sition to the strategic thinking embraced by their judgment. He fails to
recognize that the President's policy may lead to more effective arms
control than currently exists; sound judgment regarding a nation's de-
fense rests with a realistic assessment of the nature of the threat to a
nation's security.
Once the notion of mutual assured destruction has been discarded
by either superpower, prudence dictates that each superpower recog-
nize that it is in their nation's interest to respond to this shift in the
environment. Such a response does not lead to war, nor does it even
make war more imminent. It does reflect a nation's determination to
respond to a threat to its security. Superpowers must be perceived by
their adversaries as self-interested actors who are prepared to act on
that self-interest. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons has no
meaning when an adversary recognizes that a nation is unwilling to
employ its weapons. Essentially, arms control represents the resolution
of the mutual self-interest of each actor. The arms control process al-
lows the deterrence model to be employed as both superpowers recog-
nize that it is in their best interest to come to an understanding of
their relative strengths, primarily because the threat of a nuclear ex-
change is real.
Comprehensive and effective arms control policy should be seen as
more than an agreement to limit or reduce nuclear arsenals. An agree-
ment may take place not because national actors are willing to make
concessions that promote global peace, but because national actors per-
ceive it to be in their nation's interest to reach some accord. In other
words, limitations or reductions in nuclear weapons can be the product
of an effective United States arms control policy, but they are not the
goals of that policy. The objective of United States arms control policy
is to influence the Soviet leadership to alter their perceptions of what
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is in their nation's best interest.
The most striking feature of President Reagan's policies and pro-
nouncements regarding the Soviet Union is his failure to clarify his
Administration's priorities and long-term purposes vis-a-vis the Krem-
lin. While his antipathy to Communist ideology has been clearly ar-
ticulated, what this position means for the future of the relationship
between the two superpowers is hard to determine. This situation con-
cerns Scheer, who maintains an abiding confidence in his opinion that
all Reagan and Andropov need to do is sit down together and realize
that the future of the world is at stake. But it is not that simple, and
precisely because it is not that simple it can be argued that the Presi-
dent maintains an advantage by keeping the Soviet Union guessing.
One can assume that at least one purpose behind the President's
hard line toward the Soviets is to encourage them to think twice before
initiating any new international ventures similar to Afghanistan and
Poland. Reagan's Latin American policies provide additional evidence
of this purpose. In addition, the President may be hoping to convince
the Soviet leadership that he is serious about a new arms race and that
the status of the Soviet Union's domestic economy makes its chances
of winning such a race quite improbable. Should the Soviet leadership
come to recognize this possibility, they might enter arms negotiations
with a more open mind. Whatever the Administration's long-term pur-
poses, the United States stands to benefit from a policy that not only
recognizes the uncertainty of international politics, but also employs
that uncertainty to the nation's advantage.
The environment in which international relations transpire differs
substantially from that in which domestic politics take place. The im-
mediate objective of every Administration should not be to change that
environment, but to understand it and to work effectively within it. It
is, however, an environment that Scheer does not seem to understand,
or else he fails to discuss it intelligently. What really bothers Robert
Scheer is that uncertainty and unpredictability are dangerous elements
in international relations, now more than ever. His book could have
contributed a great deal of important information necessary for re-
sponsible decision-making. It fails to make this contribution because it
is neither informative nor informed. Rather than contributing to the
national dialogue surrounding this issue, Mr. Scheer only has added to
its characteristic confusion.
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